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1. Introduction 
In the last three decades the institutional integration of the European economies has been 
ever increasing, in particular since the adoption of the single currency in 2001. However, despite the 
protracted efforts to co-ordinate monetary and fiscal policies, several important differences still 
remain across the members of the European Union. Although a full-fledged European labour market 
is still a long way to come, it is possible to identify some common institutional developments such 
as the so-called "partial deregulations" initiated in the mid-1990s. Since a deregulation implies, in 
most cases, the reduction of job protection for the incumbent workers, reforms run into strong 
political opposition. As a consequence, the governments have decided to introduce reforms only at 
the margin, by reducing protection only for new hirings. While the extent of the reforms has been 
different for each country, the liberalization of both fixed-term contracts (hereafter FTCs) and 
temporary work agencies (hereafter TWA) have been common elements. 
The related literature has paid particular attention to the effect of labour market institutions 
on the employment level (see Nickell and Layard, 1999; Bassanini and Duval, 2006). Although no 
clear-cut results on this relationship exist,
1 a consensus emerges on the point that protective labour 
market institutions dampen the employment fluctuations.
2 In this line, Bentolila and Bertola (1990) 
and Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1994) examine the effect of adjustment costs on labour demand, 
obtaining that hiring and firing costs reduce the cyclical variability of employment. Veracierto 
(2008) also finds that firing taxes reduce the employment fluctuations over the business cycle. 
However, adjustment costs are not the only source of labour market rigidity. Wages are not less 
regulated than dismissals  (for instance, laws  introducing centralized bargaining, wage floors, 
seniority rules, and inflation indexation, among others). Labour market regulation, therefore, 
includes a ramified structure of restrictions, and it is necessary to consider their joint effect in order 
to evaluate their impact on the aggregate employment. For this purpose, it is essential to observe 
                                                           
1 See Howell et al. (2007) for a survey of the empirical evidence. 
2 It is worth stressing that labour market protection also has other consequences. Authors such as Blanchard (1997), 
Cabrales and Hopenhayn (1997) and Campbell and Fisher (2000) investigate their effects on job creation and 
destruction. Likewise, Bertola (1994) analyses their impact on growth. Despite their different approaches, all of these 
authors share the basic result that firing costs lower the response of the economy to aggregate shocks.   8
that rigidities are complementary: wage flexibility can be used to undo any firing restriction by a 
contract that shifts firing costs on the workers (see Lazear, 1990) or by inducing a voluntary quit. 
Likewise, firing limitations assure that the outsiders cannot efficiently undercut the insiders’ wage.  
It is in the very nature of protective labour market institutions to shield workers from 
macroeconomic fluctuations. Agell (2002) shows that labour market regulation can be interpreted 
not only as a barrier to competition, but also as an insurance scheme in presence of risk aversion 
and capital market imperfections. In other words, existing labour market institutions can be 
regarded as the result of a demand for rent-seeking and social insurance. Both purposes imply that 
labour market flexibility is visible through an increased responsiveness of the aggregate 
employment to macroeconomic shocks.
3 The empirical evidence, indeed, supports this conjecture 
(see Bertola, 1990; and Backus et al., 1995, for studies performed before the wave of partial 
reforms; Jiménez-Rodríguez and Russo, 2008, for a study developed after the partial reforms).
4 
Another strand of the literature uses microeconometric techniques to evaluate the effect of 
labour market reforms. For instance, Garibaldi (1998) and Messina and Vallanti (2007) show that 
employment protection makes job destruction less responsive to the business cycle. Garcia-Serrano 
(1998) finds that FTCs increase the employment volatility by increasing both the hiring and firing 
rates.  
The microeconometric approach is very useful to investigate the effect of a single reform, 
though less convenient to analyse the effect of a reform process, since the latter implies a series of 
reforms, which are usually complementary and show their impact only at the end of a prolonged 
period (see Orszag and Snower, 1998). Besides, microdata-based outcomes rely on short-time 
horizons and they are affected by the underlying trends. This makes it difficult to disentangle the 
                                                           
3 Bertola and Rogerson (1997) stress that a flexible economy could display less employment volatility. This is possible 
because, when prices (wages) are rigid, only quantities (employment) adjust in response to shocks. Allowing wage 
flexibility would then reduce the employment fluctuations. However, for the above-outlined reasons, wage rigidity 
without firing restrictions would be of little use for providing the insiders with either insurance or rents. As far as the 
labour market presents complementary regulations, more wage flexibility contributes to dismantle the protection for the 
incumbents against competition and against shocks. 
4 Bertola (1990) finds that employment is less volatile in countries with high job-protection. Backus et al. (1995) 
observe that employment volatility is 30% lower in Europe than in the US. Jiménez-Rodríguez and Russo (2008) find 
an increase of the employment volatility in Italy after the partial reforms of the mid-1990s.   9
effect of a reform from the effect of a country-specific trend: an increase in employment might be 
due simply to a booming economy, and vice-versa (see Kahn, 2007; Holmlund and Storrie, 2002). 
Therefore, we consider that the long-term perspective adopted in this paper provides useful 
information on the effect of (partial) labour market reforms. 
The contribution of this paper is to extend the empirical work on the effects of partial labour 
market reforms by analysing the possible changes in the dynamic response of the aggregate 
employment to output shocks for some major European Union countries (France, Germany, Italy, 
and Spain).
5 These nations are economies of comparable size and typical examples of partial labour 
market reforms, with strict job protection for regular workers and comparatively little protection for 
"atypical" workers.
6 Our goal is twofold. First, we analyse whether the response of the aggregate 
employment to output shocks in the countries under consideration has increased after the mid-1990s 
labour market reforms.
7 Second, we compare the post-reform responses to the UK one, in order to 
check whether they have become more similar to a country with a deregulated labour market.
8 In 
doing so, we use an approach based on a recursively identified bivariate VAR model.    
This paper shows that partial labour market reforms have considerably affected the response 
of the aggregate employment, and have made it quite similar to the UK one. These results lead us to 
confirm that partial reforms, originally conceived to relax regulations in order to ease labour market 
access for the young people and the long-term unemployed, have had an important effect on the 
labour market as a whole. However, we do not conclude that partial reforms are equivalent to a 
complete deregulation. While the response of the aggregate employment is now not statistically 
different between “rigid” countries and the UK, the creation of a dual labour market implies that the 
                                                           
5 We have also included Germany in our study for sake of completeness, but the data inconsistency due to the 1989 
reunification, forces us to a very rough analysis. 
6 Notice that all the countries considered have only introduced labour market reforms at the margin, i.e., partial reforms. 
7 Despite the fact that we emphasize the role of institutional reforms in determining the possible rise of aggregate 
employment fluctuations to output shocks, we are aware that there could be alternative explanations (see, for example, 
Azariadis and Pissarides, 2007; OECD, 2007). For this reason, we propose a simple check to verify that institutions are 
still crucial to understand the response of the aggregate employment to shocks. We are indebted to an anonymous 
referee for this point. 
8 The OECD index of overall employment protection is 2.8 for France, 2.6 for Germany, 3.2 for Italy, 3 for Spain, and 1 
for the UK. The index goes from 0 to 4. Protection for permanent workers accounts for 1.3 points (France), 1.7 
(Germany), 1.5 (Italy), 1.7 (Spain), and 0.8 (UK). See OECD (2004) for further information on the construction of the 
index.   10
employment adjustment concerns mainly the unprotected workers, who act as a buffer. While this 
outcome is known especially for Spain (Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1992; Saint-Paul, 2004), the 
evidence found in this paper suggests another possible source of concern: after the partial reforms, 
in Italy and France shocks last longer and cause larger employment fluctuations. It seems therefore 
that these two countries have combined “the worst of both worlds” (Saint-Paul 2004):  they display 
wide employment fluctuations, as “flexible” countries, and strong shock persistence, as “rigid” 
countries. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the partial labour market 
reforms of the countries studied. Section 3 describes the methodology. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results. Section 5 discusses some alternative possibilities for the rise of employment 
volatility, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Labour Market Regulation 
This Section briefly summarizes the main partial labour market reforms adopted in the 
countries considered. The usual approach to deregulate the labour market has been to add 
periodically new reforms, rather than enacting a single one. 
2.1. Italy 
  The Italian labour market has undergone a long-lasting deregulation process. In 1984 the 
wage indexation to inflation was reduced by 15%, and part-time and training contracts were 
introduced.
9 Wage indexation, further reduced in 1986, was finally dismantled in 1992. In 1993 a 
law (the so-called "Giugni Agreement") reformed the wage setting by introducing a two-stage wage 
bargaining: a national-level bargaining to preserve the purchasing power, and a firm-level 
bargaining to share productivity gains. The Agreement was indeed a comprehensive reform, which 
announced wage moderation and reshaped the industrial relations. Since 1994 different kinds of 
                                                           
9 Training contracts for young workers were introduced for the first time after the 1960s. Such contracts were used 
extensively, as they provided for a lower wage and made it possible to fire an employee at termination (three years) 
without costs. The described changes established important innovations with respect to the previous decade. For more 
details on Italian labour market reforms, see Jiménez-Rodríguez and Russo (2008).   11
FTCs were allowed making it possible to hire almost any worker under a FTC, and TWA broke the 
monopoly of public employment agencies. It is important to remark that deregulation in Italy 
concerned both employment contracts and wage bargaining. 
2.2. France 
   France was quite reluctant to reduce job-protection. Among the countries presented in this 
paper, France was the only one to go against the tide of deregulation. In fact, the reforms adopted 
by the socialist government in 2001 tried to intensify labour market regulation (severance pay 
entitlements were increased and the working time was reduced; see OECD, 2004). Apparently, 
FTCs have been the only flexibility device. They were introduced in 1990, when a 1982 law was 
amended to make their use easier, but their regulation was further relaxed over time. The use of 
FTCs was extensive (see Blanchard and Landier, 2002), and they quickly became a method to 




  The Spanish regulation of dismissals for permanent workers (established in 1980 with the 
Workers' Statute) was quite restrictive. The 1984 reform liberalized the use of temporary contracts 
and reduced their dismissal costs to 12 days pay for year of seniority, with no possibility to appeal 
for unfair dismissal. As a result, in the early 1990s the share of temporary contracts over the total 
employment was over 30%, and 95% of new hirings occurred under such contracts (see Kugler et 
al., 2003). 
      In 1994 new regulations were introduced to allow temporary employment only for seasonal 
jobs, and to substitute part-time work to temporary work. For this reason, TWA were also allowed. 
In practice, however, employers continued to hire workers under FTCs for all types of jobs (see Gil 
Martin, 2002; Kugler et al., 2003). 
                                                           
10 The share of FTCs over the total employment was 14% from 1996 to 2001, and 13.86% from 2002 to 2007 (Source: 
Eurostat).   12
  The dissatisfaction for the 1994 reform led to another reform in 1997, based on the idea of 
stimulating the use of permanent contracts, rather than introducing further ineffective regulation. 
TWA regulation was made more restrictive and, on the other hand, both unfair dismissal costs and 
payroll taxes were substantially reduced for some categories of workers and in case of conversions 
of FTCs into permanent contracts.
11 Kugler et al. (2003) show that this reform only affected 
marginally the substitution of permanent contract to FTCs. 
      In 2001, a new law modified again the regulation of part-time work by suppressing the 
ceiling for the number of part-time hours (established at 77% of a full-time contract) and by 
allowing a more flexible distribution of working hours groups (see Gil Martin, 2002). 
2.4. Germany 
In Germany, the main institutional reforms are similar to those enacted in the other countries 
under analysis. A comprehensive reform of labour market institutions was decided because the 
burden of the reunification and the increase in unemployment over the 1990s put the generous 
unemployment benefit system at risk of financial collapse (see, e.g., Jacobi and Kluve, 2007). As a 
first step, in 1994, the TWA regulation dating back to 1972 was loosened. Then, the so-called Hartz 
reforms were implemented over the period 2002-05. 
The Hartz reforms aimed at (1) improving the efficiency of both public and private labour 
market services; (2) stimulating the unemployed to search and accept new jobs; (3) deregulating the 
labour market. Since this paper is mainly focused on point (3), we refer to Jacobi and Kluve (2007) 
for points (1) and (2), and we briefly summarize the measures of labour market deregulation, which 
concern, again, temporary jobs. 
In 1996 the regulation concerning the renewal period and the frequency of FTCs was 
abolished, providing that the worker under a FTC was paid and treated as a corresponding regular 
worker. In 2002 the maximum duration of a TWA was brought to 24 months, and liberalized from 
                                                           
11 For workers under 30 or over 45, the long-term unemployed, women under-represented in their occupations, and 
disabled workers, unfair dismissal costs were reduced by 25% and payroll taxes were reduced between 40 and 90% (see 
Kugler et al., 2003). 
   13
January first, 2004. Standard employment relations were not affected by the reform, except for 
smaller firms: exemption from dismissal protection legislation, formerly granted to firms up to 5 
employees, was extended up to 10 employees. 
2.5. UK 
The UK shows a remarkable institutional stability on the "flexible" side. After the Thatcher 
deregulation in the 1980s (see, e.g., Card and Freeman, 2002), we observe a moderate  increase in 
job protection in 2000, when a reform lowered from two to one year the tenure necessary for a 
worker to be able to sue her employer for unfair dismissal. In 2002 the maximum duration for a 
FTC was limited to 4 years, being previously unlimited (see OECD, 2004). 
  
3. Methodology 
3.1. The choice of the subperiods 
It is our aim to analyse the effects of labour market reforms on the behaviour of the 
aggregate employment.
12 To do so, we split our time series in two periods: a "pre-reform" period 
and a "post-reform" period; then we estimate and compare the related impulse response functions 
(IRFs).
13 It is not immediate to pick out a proper breakdate, since labour market reforms are an 
ongoing process rather than a one-off innovation (see Section 2).
14 However, it is possible to point 
out some key reforms, which opened the way to further legislative innovations and set up a 
watershed in labour legislation. 
  In Italy, we can identify two waves of partial labour market reforms, one in the mid-1980s 
and another in the mid-1990s. Thus, we let our first sample period start in 1984:1. The second -and 
most important- stream of reforms appears since 1993, with the approval of the "Giugni 
                                                           
12 We use quarterly data from OECD's Economic Outlook database. 
13 We assume implicitly that the IRFs are not different over different phases of the business cycle. This assumption is 
not irrelevant: Glosser and Golden (2005), for example, show that in the US such asymmetries are likely to occur. In 
our case, this problem is less important because the division in subperiods restricts the impact of recessions to few 
observations. Noticeably, also Glosser and Golden (2005) cannot estimate separately the response to expansions and 
recessions for insufficient sample size (they use 1960-79 and 1980-95). 
14 Our results are robust to the use of alternative one-year breakdates within the reform process. An Appendix with this 
information is available from the authors upon request.   14
Agreement" and the introduction of additional deregulation for FTCs (see Section 2). The latter 
were further liberalized in the following years. As such, we choose 1993:3 to split the sample 
period. 
  We split the French series in 1990:3 because it coincides with the liberalization of FTCs (see 
Blanchard and Landier, 2002). 
  The Spanish case is, instead, quite different. The 1984 reform suddenly liberalized the use of 
FTCs in a country with a high level of job-protection. That is why we start our first sample period 
in 1984:1. Moreover, the dissatisfaction for the 1994 reform, which led to another reform in 1997, 
makes us select 1997:3 as the starting point for the second sample period. 
   The UK labour market does not show any substantial reform over the period 1980:1-2008:3, 
thus there is no need to divide the sample in subperiods to consider an institutional change. 
However, we exploit this situation to test the hypothesis that other variables related to globalization 
or capital mobility may be the true causes of the results we observe for the other countries (see 
Section 5). As such, we split the sample in 1991:2. If the IRFs estimated over the two subsamples 
are not statistically different, we reject the hypothesis that our results are driven by 
globalization/capital mobility.
15 
  Finally, for applying our approach to Germany, we should have split our sample into the 
1984-2001 and 2002-2008 subperiods (i.e., before and after the Hartz reforms). However, this is not 
possible because German employment data are inconsistent before 1990 due to the 1989 
reunification and the 2002-2008 period is too short. Notwithstanding this, we have decided to 
include Germany in our analysis for sake of completeness. In order to capture some information 
within such a restricted sample, we have been compelled to force our method. Thus, the related 
results (presented separately) can be considered only as exploratory indications. Therefore, we first 
estimate the German IRF of the employment over the sample  1994-2008, which includes the Hartz 
reforms.
16 Then, we estimate the IRF over 1994-2002, i.e. before the reforms. If the partial 
                                                           
15 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
16 We have discarded the 1990-1993 data since 1994 coincides with the introduction of the TWAs.   15
deregulation made the employment more responsive to shocks, the second IRF should display a 
weaker employment response. In other words, we expect that the IRF including the Hartz reforms 
lies above the IRF before the reforms. 
3.2. The Data     
  We first study the order of integration of all variables considered in this study by performing 
unit root tests for each subperiod defined above. Once the order of integration of our variables is 
established for each sample period, if they are non-stationary in levels we test for the presence of a 
cointegration relationship.
17 To do so, we calculate the trace and maximum eigenvalue test statistics 
(see, e.g., Johansen, 1995). Finally, when non-evidence of cointegration is found
18 we consider a 
recursively identified bivariate VAR model for each sample period with variables in log-levels:
19 
  t p t p t t X X z [ E E E         ... 1 1 0 , 
where  t z  is a vector that contains the real GDP and the aggregate employment (entering the model 
in that order).
20 We estimate by maximum likelihood and we choose the suitable lag length on the 
basis of the likelihood ratio test. We obtain the IRFs of the aggregate employment to an output 
shock for each subsample and their corresponding 95% confidence bands calculated through Monte 
                                                           
17 Apart form analysing the stationarity and cointegration of the variables for each subsample, for completeness we have 
also studied the order of integration of the variables for the full sample in France, Italy and Spain by performing 
stationarity tests allowing for structural breaks (specifically, the test statistic S
∗∗∗ developed by Busetti and Taylor, 
2003). This test indicates the existence of non-stationarity of the levels of the variables and the stationarity of the first 
log-differences. Additionally, we have also tested for the presence of a cointegration relationship by applying the 
Gregory-Hansen (1996) extension of the Engle-Granger (1987) test, which allows for breaks in either the intercept or 
the intercept and trend of the cointegrating relationship. The outcomes of the latter test are consistent with lack of 
cointegration at the 5% significance level. It is worth stressing that the breakdates are established in the dates used to 
split the sample. An Appendix with these results is available from the authors upon request. 
18 In the case of cointegration, we use a bivariate VEC model. 
19 The researcher confronts the trade-off between (statistical) efficiency and the potential loss of information that takes 
place when I(1) variables are differenced. The VAR model should be specified as a vector error correction model (i.e., 
restricted VAR model) when cointegration exists. However, it is worth noting that including misspecified cointegrating 
relationships in the VAR model in levels would lead to biased estimates, and estimating the VAR model in first 
differences would lead to a loss of information in the levels (see, Sims et al., 1990). We can find a brand of the 
macroeconomic literature which uses variables the levels/log-levels of I(1) variables in the VAR model specifications 
(see, Sims, 1992;  Eichenbaum and Evans, 1995; Cushman and Zha, 1997; Bernake and Mihov, 1998; Christiano, 
Eichenbaum and Evans, 1999;  Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2005; Dedola and Lippi, 2005; among others). For 
further discussion in this issue, see, e.g., Hamilton (1994), and Ramaswamy and Sl￿k (1998). 
20 It is worth stressing that structural models may be another good choice, but our aim is to analyse the average effects 
of output shocks on the aggregate employment and to do so, a recursively identified bivariate VAR is a convenient 
vehicle. The use of large-dimensional VAR models requires additional identifying assumptions that may not be realistic 
and they tend to be less precisely estimated. More importantly, adding some variables is not required if the objective is 
merely to estimate consistently the response of employment to an output shock. See, e.g., Kilian (2008) for further 
details on the advantage of using a recursively identified bivariate VAR over the use of higher-dimensional VAR 
models.   16
Carlo with 2500 draws. If the second period IRFs did not statistically differ from those resulting for 
the first period, we could conclude that there is no evidence for the effect of labour market reforms 
on the aggregate employment.
21 
 
4. Empirical results 
  In this Section, we assess the impact of an output shock on the aggregate employment in 
France, Italy, Spain, and the UK, as well as Germany for completeness. Prior to do so, we analyse 
the order of integration of our variables by using the DFGLS and PT tests of Elliott et al. (1996), 
and the DFGLSu and QT tests of Elliott (1999), as well as the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test 
for the corresponding sample period. The results of these tests, summarized in Table 1, indicate that 
the series seem to be non-stationary in levels and stationary in first log-differences.
22 Given the 
evidence of non-stationarity, we test for the existence of cointegration between the levels of output 
and employment by applying the standard trace and maximum eigenvalue test statistics (Johansen, 
1995) for each subperiod. The outcomes are consistent with lack of cointegration at the 5% 
significance level (see Table 2).
23 Therefore, we consider a recursively identified bivariate VAR 
model with real GDP and aggregate employment in log-levels.
24 
   Figure 1 displays the effects of an output shock on the aggregate employment for the first 
subsample ("pre-reform" period) in France, Italy, and Spain, with their corresponding 95% 
confidence intervals, as well as the estimated impact on the aggregate employment for the second 
subsample ("post-reform" period). On comparing the results from both sample periods, we observe 
that the responses resulting from the second subsample lie outside the confidence intervals 
calculated around the responses for the first subsample in the three countries. Moreover, the 
                                                           
21 We have performed the Chow break-point test, using bootstrapped p-values proposed by Candelon and Lütkepohl 
(2001). For each country, we test for model stability in the above-mentioned breakdates (specifically, 1990:2 for 
France, 1993:2 for Italy, and 1997:2 for Spain). Table 5 indicates that the null hypothesis of no structural change is 
rejected in all countries considered. 
22 Notice that even though we cannot observe stationarity in first log-differences for Spain, stationarity appears on 
applying the test to the whole Spanish sample allowing for structural break in 1997:2. 
23 The only exception is the Italian second subsample. Consequently, we use a VEC model in this case. 
24 Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for each country and each period.   17
employment responses for the second subsample are significantly larger than those obtained for the 
first one, with France being the country with the highest impact differential between the two periods 
(see Table 4). 
  In France, partial labour market reforms have increased significantly the employment 
responsiveness to output shocks (see Figure 1, Chart 1). Furthermore, a comparison to the UK 
enables us to draw a more interesting conclusion (see Figures 2 and 3), namely that the reforms did 
not only modify the employment responses to output shocks, but they also made it quite similar to 
the UK one. In other words, the reaction of the aggregate employment to an output shock in France 
is now quite close to that found for the most flexible European labour market. In addition, it is 
important to remark that in the second subsample shocks are more persistent. 
Results for Italy also indicate that output shocks last longer and give rise to an increased 
reaction of the aggregate employment (see Figure 1, Chart 2). Moreover, the employment response 
in the second subsample is statistically similar to the response found in the UK (see Figures 2 and 
3). 
These findings suggest that both Italian and French labour markets seem to have adopted 
inefficient reforms: the employment responds to output shocks as in competitive markets, but the 
shocks persist as in regulated markets (see Duval et al., 2007). Even though this result may look 
unexpected, it is worth to emphasize that models of rigid labour markets only predict larger 
employment fluctuations after the deregulation, and this is the focus of the present paper. Shocks 
persistence is determined by several other factors, including monetary policies and capital markets 
imperfections (see Duval et al., 2007).   
      The Spanish employment response is quite similar to that of the UK already in the first 
subsample (see Figure 2), which is not an unexpected result because Spain was the first country to 
deregulate the use of FTCs in 1984. Moreover, the 1997 reform did not reduce the response of the 
Spanish employment to output shocks, rather it became even higher than the UK one (see Figure 3).   18
A likely explanation is that the reform did not affect the overall share of FTCs
25 and higher 
flexibility was introduced for some previously safer permanent jobs. This outcome confirms Kugler 
et al. (2003) who find that the 1997 law had little effect in spurring the substitution of permanent 
contracts to FTCs.  
  The above-mentioned results are in line with Duval et al. (2007), who find that Italy and 
France perform the worst among 20 OECD countries with respect to the time needed to recover 
after a shock, the cumulative output loss, and the output gap volatility.
26 The correspondence with 
Duval et al. (2007) extends to the UK, which shows a quick recovery from shocks, a low output 
loss, and a high output gap volatility. Spain lies in the middle: it performs better than Italy and 
France, but worse than the UK. By looking at the estimated IRFs, indeed, it is also evident in our 
results that shock persistence is lowest in Spain and in the UK. 
Finally, the German employment response to an output shock over the 1994-2002 period is 
the lowest of our sample. This result is in line with the high regulation of the German labour market 
and with the obligation to pay temporary workers the same wage as permanent workers, which 
reduces the possibility to use FTCs to circumvent wage rigidity. Moreover, the employment 
response computed over the 1994-2008 period (therefore including the Hartz reforms) lies 
uniformly above that calculated for 1994-2002 (see Figure 4). Though statistically insignificant, the 
change goes in the predicted direction (see Section 3.1) and, more importantly, it does not 
contradict the results we obtain for the other countries. 
      To sum up, our findings seem to indicate that partial labour market reforms have indeed 
affected the response of the aggregate employment to output shocks in all countries under analysis. 
Moreover, the conclusions of Duval et al. (2007) strongly support our own outcomes.    
 
                                                           
25 The share of FTCs on the total employment over 1998-2007 was 15.38 for the EU-15, and 32.54 for Spain (Source: 
Eurostat). 
26 Duval et al. (2007) measure the output gap as the deviation from the GDP trend.   19
5. Alternative approaches to the rise of employment fluctuations 
Besides labour market deregulation, other factors, such as international economic integration 
and capital mobility, can affect employment volatility. The former factor works through two 
channels: (a) it increases the labour demand elasticity by enhancing the substitutability of domestic 
labour with foreign labour (offshoring), and, as a consequence, by magnifying the effects of labour 
demand shocks; (b) it exposes firms to increased competition on output markets and to exchange-
rate fluctuations (Rodrik, 1997). 
Clearly, if globalisation makes labour demand and supply more elastic, any shock leads to 
greater employment fluctuations. OECD (2007) surveys the literature concerned with this issue. The 
evidence for such an effect is quite mixed. While the available analyses suggest that it might be not 
negligible, it is still difficult to isolate the sectors and/or the conditions for it to emerge. New 
estimates at the sectoral level provided by OECD (2007) confirm that the establishment of 
international production networks contributed to expand the flexibility of firms in the OECD 
countries between 1980 and 2002. More precisely, OECD (2007) estimates proportional hazard 
models for workers to another job, unemployment or inactivity using individual panel data for 
1994-2001 in 13 European countries. The result is that foreign competition
  (measured by the 
industry-specific exchange-rate) tends to increase the probability of job separations, but the effect 
varies by sector, being more important for low-tenure and low-skill workers, and it is not significant 
for job-to-job transitions in the full sample. Overall, these findings are not in contrast with our 
approach, and they are rather complementary, because, as it is stated in OECD (2007), "the fact that 
countries with similar trade and FDI liberalisation patterns have widely different employment and 
unemployment rates, strongly supports the conclusion that the actual impact of globalisation on 
overall employment performance depends largely on domestic policy settings" (page 113).  
      According to Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) as well, "a given shock on unemployment may 
be larger or longer lasting, depending on the specific labour  market institutions". Their main   20
findings, indeed, indicate that considering the interaction of common shocks and national 
institutions yields a very good account of the evolution of unemployment in Europe. 
Regarding the capital mobility factor, Azariadis and Pissarides (2007) argue convincingly 
that capital mobility can shorten the lag of response to shocks and raise the variability of 
unemployment. They stress that the big increase in capital mobility recorded after the mid 80s was 
accompanied by a 50% increase in the volatility of unemployment.
27 For their analysis, they 
consider different subperiods (specifically, 1970-85, 1986-91, and 1992-97), which are consistent 
with those used in the present paper.
28  
Therefore, we check whether FDI flows and/or the effects of globalization are driving our 
results: an increase in the variability of the employment could be caused by the growing economic 
integration rather than by institutional change. To address this issue, we propose a simple test, 
which is based on the following ideas: (a) the FDI trend is the same in the countries under analysis; 
(b) none of these countries is sheltered from globalization. Then, if globalization or FDI drive our 
results, the response of the employment to shocks should increase even in absence of any labour 
market reform.
29 The UK gives a good opportunity to test this idea, since it receives most FDIs in 
our sample and since its labour market institutions show a remarkable stability in the period under 
analysis. Figure 5 shows that the UK IRFs of aggregate employment to output shock before and 
after the early 1990s are not statistically different. Then, we reject the hypothesis that our results are 
driven by globalization/capital mobility. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
Over the mid-1990s labour market regulation was blamed as a cause of "eurosclerosis". The 
poor employment performance of many countries with high standards of job protection was 
                                                           
27 They measure the volatility as the standard deviation of the cyclical component of the unemployment. 
28 It is worth stressing that the ratio of Foreign Domestic Investment (FDI) to domestic investment doubles again 
between 1997 and 2008. The current ratio is 15.35% for France, 11.74% for Germany, 5.35% for Italy, 13.86 for Spain, 
27.5% for the UK (source: the World Bank). 
29 This check does not obviously allow to disentangle the effect of FDI from the effect of outsourcing, but it is sufficient 
for our purposes.   21
considered a proof that deregulation was urgent (see Siebert, 1997). However, to overcome the 
difficulty of reducing job protection for incumbent workers, governments chose to enact partial 
labour market reforms, which reduced protection only for workers under deregulated contracts. The 
possible effects of labour market regulation over the employment level are still an open question. 
The effects of partial reforms are uncertain as well, and there is no consensus about whether they 
lead to increase the “regular” employment or they lead to create a pool of permanently 
disadvantaged workers. 
This paper has investigated the effect of partial labour market reforms on the dynamic 
behaviour of the aggregate employment for some representative EU countries. Our purpose required 
a comparison of the employment response to output shocks over a prolonged time horizon. 
Therefore, we exploited the series of the last three decades. Our approach, in comparison with the 
related literature, has the advantage of comparing different eras of labour market regulation. 
      Our findings suggest that the response of the aggregate employment to output shocks has 
become significantly higher after the partial labour market reforms, making the impact of the shock 
quite similar among Italy, France Spain and the UK.  This is distinctly evident for Spain, whose 
employment shows a response to output shocks even higher than the UK. In addition, when we look 
at the shock persistence, we find some allegedly unexpected effects in Italy and France. While 
Spain’s employment reproduces to a certain extent both the responsiveness and the resilience of the 
UK economy, Italy and France connect the sensitivity to shocks of a “flexible” economy with the 
sluggish adjustment of a “rigid” economy, and they seem to be worse off on both sides of the trade-
off. Such an outcome, on the one hand, confirms that, since the majority of workers still enjoys high 
job protection, the cost of the employment adjustment to shocks is borne mainly by "atypical" 
workers (see Dolado et al., 2002; Bentolila and Dolado, 1994a and 1994b). On the other hand, the 
evidence shown in this paper denotes the possibility that partial reforms might have had undesirable 
consequences even with respect to the persistence of aggregate shocks. Finally, it is worth to 
mention the considerable correspondence between our findings and those of Duval et al. (2007).   22
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 Table 1: Unit-root tests 
 
    Model with constant and trend  Model with constant  Model without constant
   ADF DFGLS  PT DFGLSU Q T ADF  DFGLS  PT DFGLSU Q T ADF DFGLS 
Real GDP in Levels           
                    
FRA  1
st period  -1.49 -0.65 89.85 -1.18  45.11  3.61 3.98 390.9  1.45  368.8  2.80  2.80 
                    
  2
nd period  -2.74 -2.13 8.80  -2.44  3.91  -0.19 0.50  55.44 -0.53  37.47 2.57  2.57 
                    
GER  1994:1-2002:4  -1.78 -2.00 11.16 -2.02  6.35  -1.07 0.57  142.9 -0.95  161.20  4.01  4.01 
                    
  1994:1-2008:3 -1.76  -1.66  17.92  -1.73  9.26  -0.79 2.18  270.3 -0.73  218.52  5.12  5.12 
                    
ITA  1
st period  1.76 0.47 67.22  0.11  39.70  -2.35  -1.22 4.13* -1.72  15.86 0.58  0.58 
                    
  2
nd period  -1.15 -0.98 18.80 -1.29  8.66  -1.79 0.51  89.38 -0.80  58.75 2.57  2.57 
                    
SPA  1
st period  -1.82 -1.73 11.56 -1.81  6.23  -1.55 0.15  19.12 -0.81  17.12 2.26  2.26 
                    
  2
nd period  -1.44 -0.93 0.14***  -1.36  0.03*** -2.21 -1.51 0.03***  -1.71  11.19 0.27  0.27 
                    
UK  Whole period  -2.55 -2.80*  11.27 -2.85  4.20  -1.40 0.24  56.51 -1.70  36.19 3.78  3.78 
                    
Real GDP in First Log-Differences           
                    
FRA  1
st period  -5.36*** -4.71*** 5.99*  -5.12***  3.17*  -3.04**  -1.50 10.50 -2.85**  7.73  -0.76  -0.76 
                    
  2
nd period  -5.03*** -5.09*** 3.24***  -5.07***  1.80***  -3.32**  -3.34*** 1.34***  -3.35***  2.67***  -2.03**  -2.03** 
                    
GER  1994:1-2002:4  -6.43*** -6.61*** 5.15**  -6.59***  2.84**  -6.39*** -6.45*** 1.47***  -6.46***  2.90***  -2.51**  -2.51** 
                    
  1994:1-2008:3 -6.94*** -6.96*** 3.34*** -6.85***  1.86***  -6.99*** -7.01*** 1.06***  -6.97***  1.97***  -1.87*  -1.87* 
                    
ITA  1
st period  -5.13*** -4.87*** 5.61**  -5.06***  3.02*  -1.07  -1.18 7.11  -1.17  13.33 -1.01  -1.01 
                    
  2
nd period  -4.19*** -4.13*** 0.54***  -4.01***  0.40***  -3.81*** -3.70*** 0.36***  -3.90***  0.59***  -2.26**  -2.26** 
                    
SPA  1
st period  -2.88 -2.27 18.16 -2.53  8.57  -2.67*  -1.81* 7.34  -2.64*  8.19  -0.89  -0.89 
                    
  2
nd period  -1.53 -2.24 2.99***  -2.23  1.81*** -0.53 0.13 9.70 -0.79  4.51**  -0.98  -0.98 
                    
UK  Whole period  -4.26*** -1.20  30.78  -2.79  8.58  -4.42*** -0.74 25.38 -3.33***  8.82  -2.12** -2.12** 
                    
 
We use data-driven lag selection procedures for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, taking 1.645 as the critical value used for significance of lagged 
terms and 4 as the maximum number of lags allowed in these procedures into account. The same number of lags is used in the other tests considered. 
We denote with one/two/three asterisks the rejection of the null hypothesis of non-stationarity at a 10%/5%/1% critical level. Table 1: Unit-root tests (continued) 
 
    Model with constant and trend  Model with constant  Model without constant
   ADF DFGLS  PT DFGLSU Q T ADF  DFGLS  PT DFGLSU Q T ADF DFGLS 
Aggregate Employment in Levels           
                    
FRA  1
st period  -1.56 -2.06 1.58***  -2.12  1.53*** -1.52 -1.69*  0.01***  -1.70  0.01***  0.75  0.75 
                    
  2
nd period  -2.44 -1.59 16.61 -1.94  6.74  -0.59 -0.35 22.72 -0.96  28.05 1.59  1.59 
                    
GER  1994:1-2002:4  -1.32 -1.51 10.83 -1.54  6.01  -1.19 -0.98 14.43 -1.22  23.80 0.87  0.87 
                    
  1994:1-2008:3 -2.19  -2.29  5.39**  -2.30  3.06*  -0.30 0.39  27.76 -0.58  26.34 1.84  1.84 
                    
ITA  1
st period  -1.96 -1.85 9.07  -1.94  4.21  -1.72 -1.59*  5.30  -1.83  4.31**  0.25  0.25 
                    
  2
nd period  -3.05 -1.60 39.11 -2.44  15.93  0.91 2.11 196.2  0.55  232.5  4.02  4.02 
                    
SPA  1
st period  -2.97 -2.94**  4.53**  -2.96*  2.47**  -2.28 -1.28 3.78* -2.24  5.83  1.25  1.25 
                    
  2
nd period  0.59 0.95 61.48  0.19  33.74  -1.97  -1.16 6.32  -1.46  22.99 0.39  0.39 
                    
UK  Whole period  -4.04** -3.09** 5.03**  -3.81***  2.09**  -1.18 -0.71 12.42 -1.41  16.12 1.41  1.41 
                    
Aggregate Employment in First Log-Differences           
                    
FRA  1
st period  -2.70 -2.52 2.59***  -2.56  1.39*** -1.44 -1.41 5.15  -1.45  10.03 -1.26  -1.26 
                    
  2
nd period  -2.55 -2.78*  2.52***  -2.79  1.47*** -2.79*  -2.75*** 0.83***  -2.80**  1.59***  -2.26**  -2.26** 
                    
GER  1994:1-2002:4  -2.68 -2.79*  8.58  -2.83  4.87  -2.76*  -2.61*** 2.73**  -2.77**  4.87  -2.63***  -2.63*** 
                    
  1994:1-2008:3 -4.11*** -4.09*** 4.39**  -4.14***  2.37**  -4.09*** -3.68*** 1.67***  -4.12***  2.57**  -2.45**  -2.45** 
                    
ITA  1
st period  -3.65** -3.69*** 5.50**  -3.51**  1.82***  -2.23  -2.12** 0.82*** -2.30  2.18*** -1.82*  -1.82* 
                    
  2
nd period  -3.74** -1.41  39.70  -2.10  13.35  -3.37** -0.64 31.59 -2.43  14.04 -1.40  -1.40 
                    
SPA  1
st period  -1.94 -1.67 18.18 -1.79  9.17  -1.93 -1.34 8.25  -1.91  9.34  -1.55  -1.55 
                    
  2
nd period  -1.87 -2.15 10.40 -2.22  6.22  -0.85 -0.91 7.04  -1.08  10.38 -1.19  -1.19 
                    
UK  Whole period  -3.21* -3.07**  5.23** -3.23**  2.80***  -3.36*** -2.60*** 2.18***  -3.30***  2.97***  -3.05***  -3.05*** 
                    
 
We use data-driven lag selection procedures for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, taking 1.645 as the critical value used for significance of lagged 
terms and 4 as the maximum number of lags allowed in these procedures into account. The same number of lags is used in the other tests considered. 
We denote with one/two/three asterisks the rejection of the null hypothesis of non-stationarity at a 10%/5%/1% critical level. Table 2: Standard cointegration tests 
 
   Trace statistic    Max-Eigen statistic 
   none  at most 1    none  at most 1 
         
FRA  1
st period  5.362  0.010  5.352  0.010 
           
  2
nd period  9.570  0.126  9.444  0.126 
           
GER  1994:1-2002:4  12.807 1.708    11.099  1.708 
           
  1994:1-2008:3 11.597  1.453    10.144  1.453 
           
ITA  1
st period  12.128 0.707    11.421  0.707 
           
  2
nd period  33.173** 2.317    30.857**  2.317 
           
SPA  1
st period  12.867 2.689    10.178  2.689 
           
  2
nd period  14.533 1.429    13.104  1.429 
           
UK  Whole period  7.242  0.348  6.893  0.348 
          
 
For further details, see e.g. Johansen (1995). One/two asterisks mean a p-value less than 5%/1%. 
  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.
Real GDP (in log-levels)
FRA 1
st period 13.90017 13.88061 14.04606 13.80706 0.07354
2
nd period 14.20386 14.20828 14.37978 14.04851 0.11050
GER 1994:1-2002:4 14.52316 14.51905 14.58820 14.44382 0.04826
1994:1-2008:3 14.56091 14.58137 14.67677 14.44382 0.06413
ITA 1
st period 13.97215 13.99138 14.06188 13.84353 0.07356
2
nd period 14.17878 14.20665 14.26955 14.04311 0.06619
SPA 1
st period 13.34579 13.38942 13.51509 13.13745 0.11555
2
nd period 13.74070 13.74432 13.91177 13.52646 0.11565
UK Whole period 14.06721 14.03895 14.43340 13.70438 0.22137
Aggregate Employment (in log-levels)
FRA 1
st period 16.91419 16.91251 16.94467 16.89966 0.01214
2
nd period 16.98970 16.98357 17.06888 16.92436 0.04932
GER 1994:1-2002:4 17.45858 17.45106 17.48821 17.43667 0.01992
1994:1-2008:3 17.46874 17.47396 17.51349 17.43667 0.02189
ITA 1
st period 16.91521 16.91426 16.95621 16.87757 0.02332
2
nd period 16.96314 16.96133 17.04903 16.89596 0.05221
SPA 1
st period 16.32650 16.33895 16.40843 16.21910 0.05979
2
nd period 16.65522 16.65681 16.83659 16.41676 0.13112
UK Whole period 17.08779 17.08413 17.20007 16.97875 0.06143
This table provides descriptive statistics for all countries.
Table 3: Descriptive Statisticsafter 1 year after 2 years after 1 year after 2 years after 1 year after 2 years
First sample period 0.33* 0.45* 0.68* 0.41* 0.64* 0.78*
  
Second sample period 0.60* 0.89* 0.31* 0.66* 1.10* 1.03*
The entries refer to the impulse responses of aggregate employment attributed to one unit output shock. One asterisk
indicate statistical significance at the 5% critical level
Table 4: Responses of aggregate output
France Italy Spain 
  Table 5: Testing for model stability   
               
     t*  Chow break-point test statistics  Bootstrapped p-values   
          
  FRA 1990:2  24.7407  0.0288   
          
  ITA 1993:2  64.2880  0.0070   
          
  SPA 1997:2  100.8849  0.0000   
               
 
The Chow break-point test used is based on a recursive identified bivariate VAR model for each country.  
The models are estimated for the period 1980:1-2008:3 for France and 1984:1-2008:3 for Spain and Italy. 
The null hypothesis of no structural changes in t* (specifically, 1990:2 for France, 1993:2 for Italy, and 
1997:2 for Spain) is tested. Bootstrapped p-values proposed by Candelon and Lütkepohl (2001) are 
calculated on the basis of 2500 bootstrap replications.        Figure 1: This figure presents the impulse responses of aggregate employment to one unit output shock for the
first sample period (solid line), their 95% confidence intervals (dotted line), and the impulse responses obtained for






























123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2         Figure 2: This figure presents the impulse responses of aggregate employment to one unit output shock for 
the UK (solid line), their 95% confidence intervals (dotted line), and the impulse responses obtained for the first
sample period in France (dashed line with diamond markers), Germany (dashed line with circle markers), Italy 
(dashed line with square markers) and Spain (dashed line with triangle markers). 
         Figure 3: This figure presents the impulse responses of aggregate employment to one unit output shock for the
the UK (solid line), their 95% confidence intervals (dotted line), and the impulse responses obtained for the second
sample period in France (dashed line with diamond markers), Italy (dashed line with square markers) and Spain 


















123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2       Figure 4: This figure presents the impulse responses of German aggregate employment to one unit output shock 
for the 1994-2008 sample period (solid line), their 95% confidence intervals (dotted line), and the impulse responses 








123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2       Figure 5: This figure presents the impulse responses of UK aggregate employment to one unit output shock
for the first sample period (solid line), their 95% confidence intervals (dotted line), the impulse responses for the
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